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The strategic or deliberate adoption of a cognitively distanced, third-person perspective
is proposed to adaptively regulate emotions. However, studies of psychological disorders
suggest spontaneous adoption of a third-person perspective reflects counter-productive
avoidance. Here, we review studies that investigate the deliberate adoption of a
third- or first-person vantage perspective and its impact on affect in healthy people,
“sub-clinical” populations and those with psychological disorders. A systematic search
was conducted across four databases. After exclusion criteria were applied, 38 studies
were identified that investigated the impact of both imagery and verbal instructions
designed to encourage adoption of a third-person perspective on self-reported
affect. The identified studies examined a variety of outcomes related to recalling
memories, imagining scenarios andmood induction. These were associated with specific
negative emotions or mood states (dysphoria/sadness, anxiety, anger), mixed or neutral
affect autobiographical memories, and self-conscious affect (e.g., guilt). Engaging a
third-person perspective was generally associated with a reduction in the intensity
of positive and negative affect. Studies that included measures of semantic change,
suggested that this is a key mediator in reduction of affect following perspective change.
Strategically adopting a “distanced,” third-person perspective is linked to a reduction
in affect intensity across valence, but in addition has the potential to introduce new
information that regulates emotion via semantic change. Such reappraisal distinguishes
deliberate adoption of a distanced perspective from the habitual and/or spontaneous
shift in perspective that occurs in psychopathology.
Keywords: vantage perspective, mental imagery, affect, reappraisal, semantic change
INTRODUCTION
The use of cognitive strategies to modulate emotions is critical for adaptive self-regulation.
Assuming a generative role for appraisals in the experience of emotion, the dampening and
intensifying of emotion can be achieved by altering the meaning of preceding situations or
events. Emotion-regulation via “reappraisal” is achieved through two neurally separable and
psychologically distinct routes (Ochsner and Gross, 2008). Firstly, information can be verbally
reinterpreted, such that a situation or stimulus is regarded as less threatening. This is how the
term reappraisal has traditionally been used, for example in cognitive behavioral therapy. Secondly,
a third-person, detached or “distanced” perspective can be employed as a form of reappraisal;
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this can produce similar affect-regulating effects to verbal
strategies (Ochsner and Gross, 2008)1. Such perspective-shifting
might be conducive to changes in meaning by enabling the
individual to disengage from a self-immersed vantage point and
“see the bigger picture.”
Importantly, as well as visuospatial (imagery) strategies, a
distanced perspective can be achieved through verbal means,
by switching from first-person (“I”) to third-person (“she/he”)
pronoun-use (or by using proper nouns; Kross et al., 2014)
when describing the self. In either case, perspective change-
strategies permit the introduction of new and regulatory
information during appraisal of situations or events. This
is important because a variety of psychological disorders
are associated with a narrowing of information-processing
“bandwidth” (cognitive biases; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005)
and a tendency to spontaneously and habitually experience
memories or simulated future events from first- or third-
person perspectives. In these instances, deliberately-employed
perspective-shifting strategies may have an adaptive, emotion-
regulating effect, with implications for their use in therapeutic
and normative contexts.
The phenomenology of the visual vantage perspective has
been examined in various psychological disorders during
instructed recall of autobiographical events. For example, adults
and adolescents with social phobia tend to experience imagery
of social situations from a third-person perspective (Hackmann
et al., 1998, 2000; Wells et al., 1998; D’Argembeau et al., 2006;
Schreiber and Steil, 2013). Indeed, a distorted third-person self-
image is argued to be a key maintaining factor within the
cognitive model of social phobia (Clark andWells, 1995). Higher
degrees of anxiety appear to be linked to increased third-person
perspective in social phobia (Coles et al., 2001), which also comes
to dominate social phobia-related memories over time (Coles
et al., 2002).
Other anxiety disorders, including agoraphobia (Wells and
Papageorgiou, 1999; Day et al., 2004) and body-dysmorphic
disorder (Osman et al., 2004) share a similar tendency for
memories to be recalled from a third-person perspective. By
contrast, people with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)
report more first-person autobiographical memories (Lipton
et al., 2010), and more first-person images of dirt and
contamination situations compared to a non-clinical control
group (Coughtrey et al., 2013).
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms are linked
to increased third-person perspective recall of trauma memories
(Berntsen et al., 2003). In contrast to OCD and social
phobia, trauma-related memories deliberately recalled from this
perspective are reported to be less affect-provoking (McIsaac
and Eich, 2004). On the other hand, higher levels of avoidance
have been linked to an increased incidence of spontaneous (i.e.,
intrusive) third-person perspective trauma memories (Kenny
and Bryant, 2007), and occurrence of third-person perspective
during deliberate recall predicts severity of PTSD symptoms
1It should be noted that studies in this area use a multiplicity of terms to describe
the same phenomena. Studies may refer to, for example, first vs. third-person, field
vs. participant/observer, or distanced vs. immersed perspectives. Here, the terms
first- and third-person perspective will be adopted throughout for consistency.
up to 1 year after the traumatic event (Kenny et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that the tendency to adopt a third-person
perspective during explicitly cued or spontaneous recall is an
avoidance strategy that may play a role in maintenance of PTSD.
Studies that have reported an association between depression
symptoms and perspective suggest that memory valence and
perspective interact. For example, recall of negative memories
from a third-person-perspective in depressed patients is linked to
higher use of maladaptive avoidant strategies such as “emotional
detachment” and rumination (Lemogne et al., 2006;Williams and
Moulds, 2007; Kuyken and Moulds, 2009). In addition however,
vulnerability to depression appears to be linked to deficits in first-
person positive memories (Lemogne et al., 2006; Bergouignan
et al., 2008; Nelis et al., 2013). Relatedly, although negative
memories recalled from a first-person perspective were linked to
increased distress, only positive memories recalled from a third-
person perspective were linked to experiential avoidance (Moulds
et al., 2012).
Overall, the association between third-person perspective and
psychological symptoms or negative affective states across a
range of psychological disorders outlined above might suggest
that adoption of this perspective is a maladaptive (avoidance)
emotion-regulation strategy rather than an adaptive reappraisal
strategy (see e.g., Williams and Moulds, 2007). However, since
the studies on psychopathology and perspective outlined above
are largely correlational, causal inferences are not possible.
As such, experimental studies examining the link between
affect change through memory recall, imagining scenarios and
mood induction (a potential model for relevant symptoms of
psychopathology) and perspective (change) through verbal or
imagery-manipulation are particularly valuable in determining
the role of perspective in psychological disorder and emotion
regulation. Moreover experimental manipulation of perspective
allows the sufficiency of a third-person perspective in emotion
regulation to be tested. Specifically, it may be that adoption of
such a distanced perspective sets the stage for reappraisal but in
isolation has limited effects on emotion. As such, experimental
studies will be the focus of the remainder of this review.
METHODS
A systematic review of the literature was conducted using four
databases, PsychInfo, Embase, Medline, and Web of Science.
The time-frame was limited from 1980 to 2014. The search
was conducted on 7th Oct 2014 using terms relating to
perspective, affective descriptors and either mental imagery or
verbal strategies (Appendix 1).
Inclusion criteria for the review were (i) articles in peer-
reviewed journal, (ii) published in English, (iii) relating to adults,
(iv) experimental studies in which (v) participants were assigned
to one of two vantage perspective conditions (first- or third-
person) using a randomized or quasi-experimental design and
reported (vi) at least one affect-related outcome measure. Note,
our use of the term “vantage perspective” does not imply adopting
and understanding another’s perspective (i.e., theory of mind).
The initial search produced 2664 articles, and 1469
duplicates were removed, leaving 1195 articles. Titles, and
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where necessary abstracts for clarification, were reviewed
to establish subject and category relevance (excluding e.g.,
articles from chemistry journals and other life sciences),
leaving 95 articles. An abstract and full article text search was
conducted for all 95 articles, and 37 studies from 29 articles were
identified for review. References lists were also searched; one
additional article was identified yielding 38 studies in total (see
Figure 1).
RESULTS
The 38 studies identified in the search investigated the impact
of perspective on affect following memory recall, induction of
mood or imagining various scenarios (Supplementary Table 1).
For the purposes of this review, studies are organized into six
broad categories based on affect/mood type (including clinical
disorders typically associated with these affects, where relevant).
Participants comprised healthy controls, sub-clinical populations
and clinical populations. As such, the included studies were
of (i) sadness in non-clinical or “sub-clinical” (dysphoric)
participants, and those with diagnostically-verified depression,
(ii) anxiety in non-clinical participants and people with
sub-clinical symptoms (iii) anger in non-clinical participants, (iv)
self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt) in non-clinical participants,
(v) mixed or neutral affect in non-clinical participants,
and finally (vi) positive emotions in clinical and healthy
populations.
Sadness/Dysphoria
All five identified studies examined the effect of perspective on
autobiographical memories associated with sadness (Kross and
Ayduk, 2008; Williams and Moulds, 2008; Grisham et al., 2011;
Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Kross et al., 2012).
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in
Sadness/Dysphoria Studies
Non-clinical samples were used in four studies, and variously
examined memories of “overwhelming sadness and depression”
(Kross and Ayduk, 2008) and “sad” experiences (Grisham
et al., 2011). Kross and colleagues investigated memories of a
“depressing life experience” in non-clinical participants (Kross
et al., 2012), but also examine depressed patients, the only
relevant study identified that examined a clinical group (see
Supplementary Table 1).
Williams and Moulds (2008) also used non-clinical
participants. Although they were selected only on the basis
of the occurrence of involuntary memories and not the presence
of symptoms of depression, their sample was described as
“mildly dysphoric.” However, scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) were typical of healthy
volunteers, suggesting that the term dysphoric may not have
been appropriate for their sample (Wang and Gorenstein, 2013).
In contrast, Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) purposively
recruited sub-clinical participants from a student and community
sample based on high or low scores on the BDI-II (≥16 and ≤9,
respectively).
Effects of Perspective on Emotion in
Sadness/Dysphoria Studies
Studies generally demonstrate a link between the deliberate
adoption of the third- vs. first-person perspective and a
reduction in negative affect and related outcomes (Kross and
Ayduk, 2008; Grisham et al., 2011; Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema,
2011; Kross et al., 2012; see Supplementary Table 1 for more
details). Two studies suggested a dependence of the perspective-
affect relationship on depressive symptomatology (Williams and
Moulds, 2008; Kross et al., 2012), although others found that
the relationship holds even in the absence of depression or
dysphoria (Kross and Ayduk, 2008; Grisham et al., 2011; Wisco
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Anxiety was also reduced when
a negative intrusive memory was re-recalled from the third-
person perspective, and vice versa for the alternative perspective
(Williams and Moulds, 2008).
Additional Reappraisal-Related Measures in
Sadness/Dysphoria Studies
Kross and colleagues assessed semantic differences in
participants’ memories of sadness and depression (Kross
and Ayduk, 2008). Greater reconstrual (a change in meaning
or understanding about a situation) was found in participants
instructed to recall from the third-person perspective, and
mediated the effect of perspective on affect (Kross and Ayduk,
2008).
Anxiety/Threat
Supplementary Table 1 outlines six studies that examined the
effects of perspective shifting during induced anxiety or threat
(Spurr and Stopa, 2003; Lau et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012; Kross
et al., 2014).
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in
Anxiety/Threat Studies
All studies induced anxiety/threat experimentally; five studies
tested non-clinical (Lau et al., 2009;Wang et al., 2012; Kross et al.,
2014) and one (Spurr and Stopa, 2003) sub-clinical (and control)
samples based on high and low scores on the Fear of Negative
Evaluation Scale (FNES; Watson and Friend, 1969).
Effects of Perspective on Emotion in Anxiety/Threat
Studies
Reductions in anxiety and negative emotions were seen in
most studies instructing participants to adopt a third- vs.
first-person perspective (Wang et al., 2012; Kross et al.,
2014). However, a study comparing participants with sub-
clinical social anxiety with non-anxious controls, did not
find a statistically significant reduction in anxiety following
third-person perspective instructions while recalling a anxiety-
provoking performance (Spurr and Stopa, 2003).
The experience of negative social evaluation appeared to be
linked to the third-person perspective in an ostracism paradigm
among non-clinical participants. For deliberately “excluded”
participants, those instructed to adopt a third-person perspective
when recalling their experience reported an increased perception
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FIGURE 1 | Flowchart of literature search process.
of threat over time (Lau et al., 2009). No differences were found
for the “included” participants, regardless of perspective.
When attachment styles were considered (Wang et al., 2012),
a third-person perspective reduced negative affect in those with
low, but not high scores on a measure of avoidant attachment.
However, both low and high anxious attachment scorers showed
lower levels of negative affect when writing in a third-person
perspective.
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Additional Reappraisal-Related Measures in
Anxiety/Threat Studies
As in previous studies, Kross et al. (2014) included a post-event
semantic-processing measure (“stream of thought” essay), either
coded for recounting and reconstruing (Study 3) or challenge
and threat appraisals (Study 4). The third-person perspective was
associated with more reconstruing and greater perception of the
task as a challenge rather than a threat, indicating that the use of
this perspective encouraged an adaptive shift in understanding or
appraisal of the situation.
Methodological Limitations in Anxiety/Threat Studies
Although Spurr and Stopa (2003) used a number of validated
measures of anxiety in their study, the cognitive load associated
with performing the first- and third-person perspective
conditions was not well-matched. In particular, the third-person
condition required performing a secondary speech-task whereas
the first-person condition involved a relatively simple external
focus (“try as much as possible to be aware of the environment
rather than of yourself,” p.1017), which likely entailed less
cognitive load.
Anger
Six studies relating to anger experiences were identified (Kross
et al., 2005; Ayduk andKross, 2008; Ray et al., 2008;Wimalaweera
and Moulds, 2008; Mischkowski et al., 2012). These studies
are characterized by the use of “why” (rather than “what”
manipulations) which encouraged participants to consider the
causes and context of the event (rather than merely the events
themselves).
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in Anger
Studies
All studies were with non-clinical participants. Five studies asked
participants to recall an experience of feeling anger (Kross et al.,
2005; Ayduk and Kross, 2008; Ray et al., 2008; Wimalaweera and
Moulds, 2008). One study (Mischkowski et al., 2012) induced
anger experimentally using a provocation task (Bushman et al.,
2005).
Effects on Emotion in Anger Studies
The third-person perspective was associated with lower levels
of anger, emotional reactivity and negative affect in five studies,
particularly when a “why” focus was adopted (Kross et al., 2005;
Ayduk and Kross, 2008; Ray et al., 2008; Mischkowski et al.,
2012). One study (Wimalaweera and Moulds, 2008), however,
failed to replicate the latter pattern, finding instead that the third-
person “why” condition increased anger, along with increased
negative affect and intrusions.
Additional Reappraisal-Related Measures in Anger
Studies
In their second study, Kross et al. (2005) also measured the
effects of perspective on concrete and abstract construals of anger
memories. They found that lower levels of concrete (relative
to abstract) understanding mediated the third-person “why”
effect, i.e., greater abstract processing was a key element in affect
reduction when participants considered situations using a “why
analysis.”
Methodological Limitations in Anger Studies
Kross et al. (2005) assessed affect following recall of anger
memories, but did not examine whether state anger/negative
affect or the valence of the memories themselves were equivalent
at baseline, a limitation that was addressed in later study by
Wimalaweera and Moulds (2008). However, this latter study,
which did not replicate Kross et al.’s (2005) findings, may have
been insufficiently powered (∼n = 15 per condition) to detect a
medium effect (Ayduk and Kross, 2009).
Self-Conscious Emotions
Three publications reporting seven studies relating to self-
conscious emotions were identified (Libby and Eibach, 2011;
Hung and Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir and Eyal, 2013). Self-
conscious emotions, e.g., guilt and shame, can be defined as
those involving self-reflection, self-evaluation, and involving
some form of “falling-short” in relation to personally important
standards of behavior (Tracy and Robins, 2007). Self-conscious
emotions are linked to inferences about how others may perceive
and evaluate the self (Leary, 2007). For example, guilt is a
response to specific behavioral transgressions, whereas shame
has been linked to actions which reflect negatively on a person’s
entire character (Tangney and Dearing, 2003). This is in contrast
to more global negative self-evaluations often associated with
depressed mood and anxiety.
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in
Self-Conscious Emotion Studies
All studies were with non-clinical participants. Two studies asked
participants to imagine novel scenarios in which they might be
expected to feel self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment
following a socially exposing imagined situation) (Hung and
Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Studies 1 and 3) and one study
examined recall of memories of resisting or succumbing to
temptation, both potentially socially-evaluative situations (Hung
and Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Study 2). Two studies (both in
Katzir and Eyal, 2013) compared memories of self-conscious
emotions (shame/guilt) to basic emotions (sadness/anger) and
two examined the relationship between either imagined scenarios
or memories of failure experiences, shame, and perspective in
participants with high and low self-esteem (Libby et al., 2011).
Affect Outcomes in Self-Conscious Emotion Studies
A number of studies found that instructions to imagine or
recall scenarios and events using a third-person perspective
were associated with higher self-conscious affect. A third-person
perspective also increases positive self-conscious emotions (e.g.,
pride) when “resisting temptation,” and negative self-conscious
emotions (e.g., guilt) when “succumbing to temptation” (Hung
and Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Studies 1 and 2). A similar pattern
was seen in an imaginary scenario linked to both excitement
and embarrassment (Hung and Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Study 3)
in which a third-person perspective increased embarrassment,
while simultaneously lowering levels of excitement. Self-esteem
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mediated the effect of third-person perspective on shame in
failure memories such only that those with lower self-esteem
experienced higher shame from a third-person perspective (Libby
et al., 2011).
However, in two studies (Katzir and Eyal, 2013), the third-
person perspective condition was not associated with increased
levels of self-conscious emotion (guilt and shame), but was
associated with a decrease in anger and sadness, replicating
previous studies (Kross et al., 2005; Kross and Ayduk, 2008).
Additional Reappraisal-Related Measures in
Self-Conscious Emotion Studies
In their second and third studies, Hung and Mukhopadhyay
(2012) also included measures of appraisals of the
autobiographical memories; those using a third-person
perspective thought more about how others might evaluate
them rather than the positive aspects of the experience. This
was found to mediate the effect of perspective on affect in both
studies.
Katzir and Eyal (2013) also included a written task
of the anger/guilt, and sadness/shame memory which was
independently coded for self-evaluations. Although they found
that self-evaluations were more prevalent in the self-conscious
emotion condition compared to the “basic” emotion condition,
there was no effect of perspective, suggesting that these appraisals
did not mediate the effect of the third-person perspective.
Methodological Limitations in Self-Conscious
Emotion Studies
The outcome measures assessed by Hung and Mukhopadhyay
(2012) do not differentiate between “guilt” and “shame” (Tangney
and Dearing, 2003). In all three studies only a measure of guilt is
used. It is possible that inclusion of a measure of shame would
have further clarified the impact of perspective change.
Studies on Mixed and Neutral Affect
Autobiographical and Episodic Memory in
Non-clinical Samples
Nine studies were identified relating to autobiographical/episodic
memory (Robinson and Swanson, 1993; Berntsen and Rubin,
2006; Terry and Horton, 2007; Bagri and Jones, 2009; Crawley,
2010; Sutin and Robins, 2010; Seih et al., 2011; Sekiguchi and
Nonaka, 2014).
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in Mixed
and Neutral Affect Autobiographical and Episodic
Memory Studies
All studies were with non-clinical samples. Three studies
investigated “negative” autobiographical memories (Terry and
Horton, 2007; Crawley, 2010; Seih et al., 2011). Two studies
investigated both negative and “positive” autobiographical
memories (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Sekiguchi and Nonaka,
2014). Two studies investigated autobiographical memories
without specifying valence to participants (Robinson and
Swanson, 1993; Sutin and Robins, 2010), although one asked
participants to recall “self-defining” autobiographical memories
(Sutin and Robins, 2010).
Two studies were identified which investigated recall of
experimentally presented material of fictional scenes (Bagri and
Jones, 2009).
Affect Outcomes in Mixed and Neutral Affect
Autobiographical and Episodic Memory Studies
One study found reduced levels of overall emotion and
“nervousness” from a third-person perspective (Terry and
Horton, 2007) and third-person recall was associated with
reduced emotional involvement and emotional intensity in two
writing studies (Crawley, 2010; Seih et al., 2011). Recall of
affective material in episodic memory tasks was lower in a third-
person condition; in an initial study there was no difference
in the reported “emotional richness” of recall, but in a second,
potentially more highly powered study, this was lower in the
third-person perspective (Bagri and Jones, 2009). However, two
studies found no link between the adoption of a third-person
perspective and emotional intensity (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006;
Sutin and Robins, 2010).
The original (i.e., spontaneous) perspective of a memory
appears to have an important role in the effect of using a
third- or first-person perspective. In three studies, levels of affect
decreased only when first-person memories were recalled from
the third-person, and not vice versa (Robinson and Swanson,
1993; Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 2014).
This implies that shifting from a third- to first-person memory
does not intensify affect during recall.
Additional Reappraisal-Related Measures in Mixed
and Neutral Affect Autobiographical and Episodic
Memory Studies
Seih et al. (2011) also assessed use of cognitive mechanism
words (e.g., “understand”) as a measure of cognitive processing,
and found that the third-person perspective had lower levels of
cognitive processing. This appears to contrast studies such as
those reviewed above (e.g., Kross et al., 2014) which have linked
the third-person perspective to increased “semantic” processing,
arguably a related construct. This discrepancy may be explained
by the instructions given to participants in Seih et al.’s study, i.e., a
focus on “what” occurred rather than specifying a focus on “why.”
In other studies, only the “why” focused third-person perspective
shows increased semantic processing (e.g., Kross et al., 2005).
Methodological Limitations in Mixed and Neutral
Affect Autobiographical and Episodic Memory
Studies
Sutin and Robins (2010) did not find a difference in affect
when perspective was manipulated. However, inspection of
the reported means within the paper suggests that the mean
emotional intensity of the manipulated first-person perspective
is statistically lower than the spontaneously adopted (at recall)
first-person perspective [t(461) = 3.26, p = 0.001]. This anomaly
was not discussed by the authors.
The sample size used in Seih et al. (2011) was relatively
small per condition (∼n = 18), thus their study may not have
had sufficient power to detect smaller effect-size reductions in
negative affect.
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Positive Affect
Four studies relating exclusively to positive memories or
imagined positive scenarios were identified (Holmes et al., 2008;
Gruber et al., 2009; Nelis et al., 2012; Vella and Moulds, 2014).
Sample and Methodological Characteristics in
Positive Emotion Studies
Two studies investigated experimentally-presented positive
scenarios in non-clinical samples (Holmes et al., 2008; Nelis
et al., 2012). Despite focusing on positive emotions, both studies
administered clinically relevant measures, the BDI-II (Beck et al.,
1996) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait scale (STAI-
T; Spielberger et al., 1983) to establish levels of depressive and
anxious symptomatology within their sample. One study with
a non-clinical sample (Vella and Moulds, 2014) investigated
positive memories and imagined positive future events.
One study (Gruber et al., 2009) compared the effect of
changing perspective on memories of intense happiness using
both a healthy control group and a euthymic group with bipolar
I disorder, a condition associated with elevated mood (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Affect Outcomes in Positive Emotion Studies
A decrease in positive affect was linked to a third-person
perspective in two studies, in both clinical and non-clinical
participants (Holmes et al., 2008; Gruber et al., 2009). This
positive affect reduction in the third-person perspective group
was not replicated in another study (Nelis et al., 2012), in which
there was no difference between the two imagery perspectives,
both of which increased positive affect compared to general (non-
perspective related) verbal processing. Shifting from the first- to
third-person perspective for both positive memories and future
imagined positive events, decreased positive emotions such as
happiness, whereas the converse shift had no impact (Vella and
Moulds, 2014).
Methodological Limitations in Positive Emotion
Studies
Subsequent research (Nelis et al., 2013) has shown dysphoria
is associated with increased use of third-person perspective in
positive memories. Thus, it is possible that the first-person
condition in the authors’ earlier study (Nelis et al., 2012), with
higher levels of depressive symptomatology, may have had a
greater tendency to initially experience scenarios from the third-
person, even if they then followed first-person instructions.
Research reviewed above in autobiographical memories suggests
that there is no reduction in affect when moving from a third- to
a first-person perspective. This may explain the lack of difference
between the conditions.
DISCUSSION
The focus of this review was on experimental studies that
examined the effect of deliberate adoption of certain vantage
perspectives on affect. The majority of studies were with healthy
volunteers and as such, the findings are principally relevant to
normative emotion regulation, with potential implications for
psychopathology. Overall, the identified studies tended to show
that, compared to a first-person perspective, instructions to adopt
a third-person perspective was associated with reduced negative
and positive affect, a pattern also observed in the small number
of studies with clinical participants.
Several studies investigated the affective impact of perspective
during recall of sad or depressive experiences. The studies
reviewed in this paper indicate that for both non-clinical
participants, and those with subclinical and clinical depressive
symptoms, strategic (i.e., “instructed”) adoption of the third-
person perspective when recalling upsetting memories is
generally linked to lower negative affect or emotional intensity
(see Supplementary Table 1). This would appear to indicate that
the deliberate use of the third-person perspective during recall
of distressing memories activates top-down cognitive control
processes resulting in effective emotion-regulation. In contrast
preferential (“non-instructed” or spontaneous) adoption of the
third-person perspective is linked to dysfunctional avoidance
of distress during voluntary recall of negative and positive
experiences in those with depression or a vulnerability to
depression (Lemogne et al., 2006; Williams and Moulds, 2007;
Kuyken and Moulds, 2009).
In line with the above, studies relating to anxious and
threat-based memories in healthy volunteers tended to show
that instructions to adopt a third-person perspective were
linked to lower negative affect and anxiety. This contrasts
with clinical or sub-clinical anxiety, which is associated with
a spontaneous bias toward third-person perspective during
recall of anxiety-provoking situations. In addition, high levels
of worry are linked to increased use of the third-person
perspective (Finnbogadóttir and Berntsen, 2014). In line with
the ostensible avoidance function of perspective bias in
depression, these findings might suggest that in generalized
anxiety disorder (which is characterized primarily by worry),
the detached third person perspective complements the tendency
toward unproductive, repetitive verbal thought as a means
of avoiding affect. However, to date, the majority of relevant
studies have focused on memory rather than future episodic
thinking which is more relevant to generalized and other
anxiety disorders.
A number of studies suggested that the effect of instructions
to recall emotional events from the third-person perspective on
emotion depended on an additional cognitive step. Specifically,
the intensity of emotion was lower when an event was recalled
from a third-person perspective, and the focus was on why
the event happened, rather than what happened, particularly
in studies on anger (Kross et al., 2005; Ayduk and Kross,
2008; Mischkowski et al., 2012; Katzir and Eyal, 2013, Study 1).
The “why” manipulations resulted in greater semantic change,
which could reflect the greater contextual information offered
by a more distanced perspective. These findings may offer a
key insight into the difference between the adoption of the
third-person perspective as an avoidance strategy compared to
one which promotes effective emotion-regulation. When used
to promote avoidance of negative affect, an often counter-
productive emotion-regulation strategy (Hayes et al., 2011),
the third-person perspective may not be accompanied by the
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additional cognitive operations (explicitly simulated by asking
“why” questions in the studies by Kross and colleagues) which
can introduce new, contextual information. Rather, use of the
third-person perspective as an avoidance strategy may reflect a
static, inflexible cognitive style, which precludes semantic change.
The pattern of lower levels of affect with a third-person
perspective was also seen in most of the studies relating to
positive affect associated with autobiographical memories and
imagined scenarios (Holmes et al., 2008; Gruber et al., 2009;
Vella and Moulds, 2014). An absence of this pattern (Nelis et al.,
2012) may have been due to not giving consideration to the role
of depressive symptoms in initial recall perspective of positive
memories (Nelis et al., 2013).
The discussion so far has focused on basic, non-self -evaluative
emotions. When studies addressing self-conscious emotions are
considered, instructions to adopt the third-person perspective
was not consistently associated with reduced negative affect, with
two studies showing no decrease (Katzir and Eyal, 2013) and
another, an increase (Hung and Mukhopadhyay, 2012). In the
case of emotions that involve self-evaluation, self-esteem may
be an important factor in whether the third-person perspective
increased or decreased shame (Libby et al., 2011). Libby and
colleagues link this to the influence of “self-defeating interpretive
frameworks” (p. 1171); this implies that the context within
which the self is evaluated interacts with perspective and this
may explain the discrepancies observed in the studies on self-
conscious emotions.
The original (spontaneously adopted) perspective of a
memory may have a role in determining whether affect intensity
changes, as shown by those studies in which the perspective
assigned is a shift from the original perspective. All such studies
reviewed here found a reduction in intensity of affect when
shifting from an original first-person perspective to the third-
person, but no difference with the converse shift. Yet, few studies
identified in this review established the original perspective
associated with the memories, prior to instructing the recall
perspective. If the above pattern is generally true, it may be the
case that when participants are instructed to take a third-person
perspective regardless of spontaneous perspective, changes in
affect tend to be due to changes from the more prevalent
first-person memories (Nigro and Neisser, 1983). Participants
who spontaneously adopted a third-person perspective at
recall, regardless of subsequent perspective manipulation, would
therefore not be expected to show a reduction in affect.
Further, if the biased adoption of the third-person represents
an avoidance strategy, it raises a clinically relevant question as to
whether emotional processing could be facilitated through a shift
in perspective from third- to first-person.
Future research in this area would benefit from greater
methodological clarity and detail. Firstly, in studies examining
the effects of perspective on affect, the nature of participants’
baseline (i.e., “preferential” or spontaneous) perspective should
be routinely assessed. Secondly, assessment of affective states
should be performed using validated instruments (e.g., the
iPANAS for general affect or suitably brief emotion-specific
measures) rather than unvalidated single-itemmeasures. Further,
given the intriguing finding that semantic change is a mediator
of affective change it is of interest to determine whether
“why analysis” manipulations during perspective shifts promote
semantic change across emotion categories (particularly anxiety
and sadness) and participant groups (non-clinical and clinical).
Since “why?” questions can promote an abstract processing style
characterized by unproductive repetitive thinking (rumination)
in depression (Watkins and Teasdale, 2001) it would be
particularly interesting to determine the effects of structured
and time-limited “why?” analyses (as used in studies by Kross
and colleagues) in the context of perspective shifting in clinical
depression for example.
Given the apparent contrast between third-person perspective
as an effective emotion-regulation strategy and as characteristic
of those with mood or anxiety disorders, future studies should
investigate the effect of perspective change within clinical
populations; although some work has already started in this area
(Kross et al., 2012), it remains unclear as to the effect in anxious
populations for example. A more comprehensive understanding
of the extent and role of spontaneous and strategic third person
perspective deployment across disorders seems appropriate. To
further clarify the nature of the relationship between perspective
change and avoidance as a cognitive style, measures of avoidance
should be employed, for both autobiographical memories (e.g.,
Horowitz et al., 1979) and future episodic thinking (e.g.,
Deeprose and Holmes, 2010).
Nonetheless, clinicians should still carefully examine the
perspective adopted in imagery to consider its impact on a client’s
experience of affect (Hales et al., 2014). This review suggests that,
for autobiographical imagery at least, the perspective adopted in
the image could have important emotional consequences, and
if the same pattern is present in the type of intrusive imagery
experienced in clinical disorders (Pearson et al., 2015), this could
represent a target for intervention.
Finally, it would be helpful if future studies could clarify
how strategic change in perspective compares against other
emotion regulation strategies. For example, given the link
between imagery and affect (Holmes and Mathews, 2005, 2010),
it would be of interest to determine the relative efficacy of
visuospatial (perspective change) and verbal reappraisal as
emotion regulation strategies.
We acknowledge this review has some limitations in terms of
methodology and scope. For example, only one author identified
articles, and this may have resulted in inadvertent exclusions.
Further, the scope of the review was limited to first- and third-
person perspectives. However, we acknowledge that other types
of spatiotemporal perspective manipulation can impact affect,
for example, imagined increasing spatial distance between a
recalled scene and the observer (perspective). When negative
scenes are imagined as moving away, this is linked to lower
negative affect (Davis et al., 2011). In addition to this, temporal
distance has been shown to interact with vantage perspective
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004, 2012). For example,
memories and imagined future events which are further away
temporally are more likely to be experienced from a third-person
perspective, compared to those which are nearer temporally
being experienced from a first-person perspective D’Argembeau
and Van der Linden (2004). Finally, our search terms may have
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failed to identify some studies on prospection given that we did
not use terms relating to “episodic foresight.”
To summarize, the perspective adopted by individuals,
whether that is a detached third-person perspective, or a first-
person perspective can have important implications for the
experience andmanagement of affect in non-clinical populations,
and potentially clinical populations too. It may be the case that in
some cases, a shift to the third-person perspective aids emotional-
regulation in the short term, but for longer term adaptive
processing, new information also needs to be incorporated.
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APPENDIX 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
SEARCH TERMS
Web of Science Search Terms
“Vantage Perspective” OR “Vantage point” OR “Field
perspective” OR “Observer perspective” OR “Observer’s
perspective” OR “Field-observer perspective” OR “Observer
perspective-taking” OR “First person perspective” OR “1st
person perspective” OR “Third person perspective” OR “3rd
person perspective” OR “Perspective taking” OR “Psychological
distanc∗” OR “Visual perspective” OR “Self distanc∗” OR
“Self immer∗.”
AND
Emotion∗ OR “psychological well-being” OR “psychological
wellbeing” OR Stress∗OR Trauma∗OR Anxiety OR anxious OR
Depress∗ORDysphori∗ORAnger OR angry OR phobi∗OR fear
OR disgust OR worry.
AND
“Self-imag∗” OR “Mental Image∗” OR Image∗ OR Imagin∗
OR Memor∗ OR “Verbal process∗” OR “Self-talk∗” OR
“Self-evaluat∗” OR Analy∗ OR Ruminat∗ OR avoid∗
OR evaluat∗ OR repetitive OR intru∗ OR future OR
prospect∗.
PsychInfo Search Terms
1. (Vantage adj Perspective)
2. (Vantage adj point)
3. (Field adj perspective)
4. (Observer adj perspective)
5. (“Observer’s” adj perspective)
6. (Field-observer adj perspective)
7. (Observer adj perspective-taking)
8. (First adj (person adj perspective))
9. (1st adj (person adj perspective))
10. (Third adj (person adj perspective))
11. (3rd adj (person adj perspective))
12. (Perspective adj taking)
13. (Psychological adj distanc∗)
14. (Visual adj perspective)
15. Self-distanc∗
16. Self-immer∗
17. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13
or 14 or 15 or 16
18. emotion∗
19. ((Psychological adj well-being) or (Psychological adj
wellbeing))
20. Stress∗
21. Trauma∗
22. (Anxiety or anxious)
23. Depress∗
24. Dysphori∗
25. (Anger or angry)
26. Fear
27. Phobi∗
28. Disgust∗
29. Worry
30. exp Emotional Regulation/
31. exp Emotions/
32. exp Emotional Disturbances/
33. exp mental disorders/
34. 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28
or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33
35. (self adj image∗)
36. (mental adj image∗)
37. image∗
38. imagin∗
39. memor∗
40. exp Memory/
41. exp Imagination/
42. exp Self Concept/
43. (verbal adj process∗)
44. self-talk∗
45. self-evaluat∗
46. Analy∗
47. ruminat∗
48. avoid∗
49. evaluat∗
50. evaluat∗
51. repetitive
52. intrus∗
53. future
54. prospect∗
55. exp Cognitive Processes/
56. exp Self Talk/
57. exp Self Evaluation/
58. 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45
or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or
56 or 57
59. 17 and 34 and 58
60. limit 59 to (human and english language and journal article
and yr=“1980 –Current”)
Medline Search Terms
1. (Vantage adj Perspective)
2. (Vantage adj point)
3. (Field adj perspective)
4. (Observer adj perspective)
5. (“Observer’s” adj perspective)
6. (Field-observer adj perspective)
7. (Observer adj perspective-taking)
8. (First adj (person adj perspective))
9. (1st adj (person adj perspective))
10. (Third adj (person adj perspective))
11. (3rd adj (person adj perspective))
12. (Perspective adj taking)
13. (psychological adj distance)
14. (Visual adj perspective)
15. “Self-distanc$”
16. (Self adj immer$)
17. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13
or 14 or 15 or 16
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18. Emotion$
19. psychological well-being
20. psychological well-being
21. stress$
22. Trauma$
23. (anxiety or anxious)
24. Depress$
25. Dysphori$
26. (Anger or angry)
27. phobi$
28. fear
29. disgust$
30. worry
31. exp Emotions/
32. exp Mental Disorders/
33. exp Depression/
34. exp Stress, Psychological/
35. exp Affective symptoms/ or exp aggression/
36. exp Mental Health/
37. 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26
or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or
35 or 36
38. Self-imag$
39. (Mental adj Image$)
40. Image$
41. Imagin$
42. memor$
43. exp Memory/
44. exp Imagination/
45. exp “Imagery (Psychotherapy)”/
46. (Verbal adj process$)
47. Self-talk$
48. Self-evaluat$
49. Analy#$
50. Ruminat$
51. avoid$
52. evaluat$
53. repetitive
54. intru$
55. future
56. prospect$
57. exp Self Concept/
58. exp Cognition/
59. exp Communication/
60. 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48
or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or
59
61. 17 and 37 and 60
62. limit 61 to (english language and humans and yr= “1980
–Current” and journal article)
63. (psychological adj distanc$)
64. 17 or 63
65. 37 and 60 and 64
66. limit 65 to (english language and humans and yr= “1980
–Current” and journal article)
EMBASE Search Terms
1. (Vantage adj Perspective)
2. (Vantage adj point)
3. (Field adj perspective)
4. (Observer adj perspective)
5. (Field-observer adj perspective)
6. (Observer adj perspective-taking)
7. (First adj (person adj perspective))
8. (1st adj (person adj perspective))
9. (Third adj (person adj perspective))
10. (3rd adj (person adj perspective))
11. (perspective adj taking)
12. (Psychological adj distance)
13. (visual adj perspective)
14. Self-distanc$
15. (Self adj immer$)
16. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13
or 14 or 15
17. Emotion$
18. ((Psychological adj well-being) or (Psychological adj
wellbeing))
19. stress$
20. Trauma$
21. (anxiety or anxious)
22. Depress$
23. Dysphori$
24. (Anger or angry)
25. phobi$
26. fear
27. disgust$
28. worry
29. exp emotion/
30. exp mental disease/
31. exp emotionality/
32. exp mental health/
33. exp stress/
34. exp social stress/
35. (Psychological adj distanc$)
36. 16 or 35
37. 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27
or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34
38. Self-imag$
39. (Mental adj Image$)
40. Image$
41. Imagin$
42. memor$
43. exp thinking/
44. exp cognition/
45. (Verbal adj process$)
46. Self-talk$
47. self-evaluat$
48. Analy#$
49. Ruminat$
50. avoid$
51. evaluat$
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52. repetitive
53. intrus$
54. future
55. prospect$
56. exp verbal behavior/
57. exp self concept/
58. 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or
47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or
56 or 57
59. 36 and 37 and 58
60. limit 59 to (human and english language and yr= “1980-
Current” and journal)
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